

Kunst
Grotesk

Born as a typeface with a 1960s atmosphere, FT Kunst Grotesk incorporates subtle details and a certain digital feeling that make it perfectly suitable for modern use. Conceived in 2014, FT Kunst Grotesk remained in stasis for a few years, only to re-emerge in 2017 with a new approach, including more contemporary touches in an attempt to bridge past and present. The family consists of 5 weights (Light, Regular, Medium, Bold, Black) with corresponding italics.

Name	FT Kunst Grotesk
Version	2.001
Date	29.01.2022
Foundry	Formula Type
Designer	Piero Di Biase
Collaborators	Nolan Paparelli and Alberto Malossi
Production	Alberto Malossi
Encoding	Latin Extended
Formats	otf, woff, woff2
Copyright	Copyright ©2022 by Piero Di Biase. All rights reserved.
Website	www.formulatype.com
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Unicode Ranges	Basic Latin, Latin-1 Supplement, Latin Extended A, Latin Extended B, Spacing Modifier Letters, Combining Diacritical Marks, Greek, General Punctuation, Superscripts and Subscripts, Currency Symbols, Combining Diacritical Marks for Symbols, Number Forms, Arrows, Mathematical Operators, Miscellaneous Symbols, Mathematical Alphanumeric Symbols.
Opentype	aalt (Access All Alternates) locl (Localized Forms) calt (Contextual Alternates) ccmp (Glyphs composition/Decomposition) subs (Subscript); sinf (Scientific Inferiors) numr (Numerators); dnom (Denominator) frac (Fractions); ordn (Ordinals) pnum (Proportional Figures); tnum (Tabular Figures) case (Case Sensitive Forms) dlig (Discretionary Ligatures); liga (Standard Ligatures) zero (Slashed Zero) ss01 (Alternate J, Q, f, j, r, t, y); ss02 (Alternate d, u) ss03 (Alternate o «»); ss04 (Alternate ®)
Supported languages	Abenaki, Afar, Afrikaans, Albanian, Alsatian, Aragonese, Aranes, Arvanitic, Asturian, Atayal, Aymara, Azerbaijani, Bashkir, Basque, Belarusian, Bemba, Bosnian, Breton, Bulgarian Romanization, Cape Verdean, Catalan, Cebuano, Chavacano, Chichewa, Chickasaw, Cimbrian, Cofan, Cornish, Corsican, Creek, Crimean Tatar, Croatian, Czech, Danish, Dawan, Delaware, Dholuo, Drehu, Dutch, English, Esperanto, Estonian, Faroese, Fijian, Filipino, Finnish, Folkspraak, French, Frisian, Friulian, Gagauz, Galician, Ganda, Genoese, German, Gikuyu, Gooniyandi, Greenlandic, Greenlandic Old Orthography, Guadeloupean, Gwichin, Haitian Creole, Han, Hawaiian, Hiligaynon, Hopi, Hotcak, Hungarian, Icelandic, Ido, Igbo, Ilocano, Indonesian, Interglossa, Interlingua, Irish, Istroromanian, Italian, Jamaican, Javanese, Jerriais, Kaingang, Kapampangan, Kaqchikel, Karakalpak, Karelian, Kashubian, Kikongo, Kinyarwanda, Kiribati, Kirundi, Klingon, Kurdish, Ladin, Latin, Latino Sine, Latvian, Lithuanian, Lojban, Lombard, Low Saxon, Luxembourgish, Maasai, Makhuwa, Malay, Maltese, Manx, Maori, Marquesan, Meglenoromanian, Mirandese, Mohawk, Moldovan, Montagnais, Montenegrin, Murrinhpatha, Nagamese Creole, Nahuatl, Ndebele, Neapolitan, Ngiyambaa, Niuean, Noongar, Norwegian, Novial, Occidental, Occitan, Old Icelandic, Old Norse, Oshiwambo, Ossétian, Palauan, Papiamentu, Piedmontese, Polish, Portuguese, Potawatomi, Qeqchi, Quechua, Rarotongan, Romanian, Romansh, Rotokas, Sami Inari, Sami Lule, Sami Northern, Sami Southern, Samoan, Sango, Saramaccan, Sardinian, Scottish Gaelic, Serbian, Seri, Seychellois, Shawnee, Shona, Sicilian, Silesian, Slovak, Slovenian, Slovio, Somali, Sorbian Lower, Sorbian Upper, Sotho Northern, Sotho Southern, Spanish, Sranan, Sundanese, Swahili, Swazi, Swedish, Tagalog, Tahitian, Tetum, Tok Pisin, Tokelauan, Tongan, Tshiluba, Tsonga, Tswana, Tumbuka, Turkish, Turkmen, Tuvaluan, Tzotzil, Ukrainian, Uzbek, Venetian, Vepsian, Volapuk, Voro, Wallisian, Walloon, Waraywaray, Warlpiri, Wayuu, Welsh, Wikmungkan, Wiradjuri, Wolof, Xavante, Xhosa, Yapese, Yindjibarndi, Zapotec, Zarma, Zazaki, Zulu, Zuni.

Typeface Overview

Uprights

Size 96 pt

Light
Regular
Medium
Bold
Black

Italics

Size 96 pt

Light
Regular
Medium
Bold
Black

Global
System

Interviews

Horizon

Formalist

HARVARD

Aesthetics

Possibility

{1953-54}

Uprising

Rethinking

Pragmatic

REAL

Tutorials

Size 7 pt

Leading 8 pt

To convey information is to create or highlight a difference from expectation. For example, when a friend tells us something we do not know or expect, they create a difference in our understanding, and the larger the difference, the higher the degree of information. On the other hand, if they tell us something we already know, this generates little or no information, because hearing it again makes little or no difference. This might sound familiar, thanks to Gregory Bateson's definition of information as a difference that makes a difference.' Two important aspects of Bateson's definition are generally overlooked, however. First, this definition implies a stable context, against which a difference will register as different. Second, the actual moment of information's difference is fleeting: a difference does not stay different for long. The new and surprising quickly becomes the known and routine, as the moment of difference settles into the equilibrium of knowledge. If typical information is a difference that quickly settles into its context, consider how art suffuses a situation with a peculiar kind of unsettled difference that is difficult to resolve. Like other forms of information, an artwork generates a difference that makes a difference. With art, however, determining precisely what that difference is and what it differs from can be difficult. For example, a grocery store poster that displays the price of apples creates a difference that makes a difference, by conveying information we did not previously knowing this case, how much apples cost. Once this difference has been made, however, we feel no need to examine the poster any further. Rather than lingering to look, we buy our apples and forget the poster without a second glance. A still life painting of apples by Paul Cézanne, on the other hand, creates a difference that reveals itself slowly. Along with its depiction of apples, the artwork seems to suggest or convey something more, but we cannot say precisely what. This indeterminacy invites us to consider the work further as we try to establish a common communicative ground.

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The apple price poster is an example of what we might call *purposive information*, with a relatively clear purpose that creates a short-term difference in the typical, straightforward sense. When I want to know the price of apples, the time of day, who won the game, or when the movie starts, I want a straight answer in the form of purposive information—not some evocative or ambiguous response that leaves me intrigued and contemplative. The Cézanne painting of apples, on the other hand, is an example of what we might call *aesthetic information*: a peculiar mode of difference with a much longer half-life that is correspondingly harder to clarify, articulate, and resolve, and so compels attention and interest over the long term. While typical information *resolves* difference into the equilibrium of fact, answer, and knowledge, artistic or aesthetic information *sustains* difference, yielding focused indeterminacies that offer not answers but possibilities. By this effect we see how *art is information as a process*, rather than information as a definable unit or measurable thing. Information as process equals difference as process, and art's operation of sustained difference is why the richness of aesthetic experience feels so categorically different from other types of experience. It is the mystery that lingers, as the saying goes, and when we are unable to resolve a difference—as with an artwork that remains poised on the...

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Existing
Criteria

Indexical
Telegram
[P. 43/44]
Anti-Form
BLAM!
Periodic

Overlook
“BRILLO”
Nonlinear
THEORY
2.217,10
Marxism

Size 7 pt

Leading 8 pt

This highlights an important aspect of difference in general—namely, that there are different types of difference. Used in its everyday sense, a difference suggests a difference-from, as when one thing differs from another. Often overlooked is a difference-as, when something is what it is precisely as a difference. This Is a Portrait of Iris Clert If I Say So offers an example of this latter type of relation: The artwork, by existing as a telegram, is notable by proclaiming its existence as art even as it resolutely lacks artistic qualities. On the other hand, the telegram, by existing as an artwork, is a utilitarian and literally prosaic means of communication now counterintuitively imbued with a message of self-declared aesthetic import. With this dually differential relation we see the difference-as: the artwork becomes what it is by fundamentally differing from other artworks because it is a telegram, while fundamentally differing from other telegrams because it is a work of art. Neither the artwork's manifestation as a telegram nor the telegram's claim to art is particularly noteworthy in and of itself. Rather, it is only in their relation as reciprocally irresolvable differences that the components acquire their import, as their back and forth ricochet of difference converges to generate the artwork we recognize as This Is a Portrait of Iris Clert If I Say So. Simultaneously grounded in and emergent from difference and self-difference, the artwork is information that remains perpetually in formation, a process of sustained differencing that yields an outcome more aesthetically complex than its modest inputs might otherwise suggest. An ongoing and difficult-to-resolve difference like this is what the mid-twentieth-century French philosopher Gilbert Simondon terms a disparation: a relation of disparities that is resolvable only at a higher or more complex level.* This slight distance between one eye and the other causes two distinct visual streams, which resolve into the rich depth perception of binocular vision.

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Along similar lines, the attempt to reconcile the disparities of *This Is a Portrait of Iris Clert If I Say* So at one scale—of art as telegram and telegram as art, considered according to the cultural and functional expectations typically applied to each—catalyzes the particularity and import of the artwork at a higher and more intensive scale, yielding a result much more thought provoking than we might reasonably expect from the unpromising aesthetic potentials of a telegram and declarative phrase. Simondon’s approach is one of the two primary information modes considered in this book, the other being Bell Laboratories engineer Claude Shannon’s 1948 mathematical theory of communication—otherwise known as *information theory*. Shannon’s approach to information, which is what we typically mean in the context of the information age, differs from Simondon’s model not only in idea, but in implication. Whereas information for Simondon is a relational operation of difference that *intensifies* or *generates* a context, such as the binocular field of vision, information for Shannon is a measure of the surprise, or difference from expectation, created when a difference emerges *into*, or travels *through*, a context—which is what Bateson sums up as a difference that makes a difference. Rauschenberg’s telegram offers an example of how Simondon’s and Shannon’s information modes work together.

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Poetry
Critics

Crystals
Encoding
Spatial
(3, 21, 27)
Feminism
CHAOS

Decoding
“*EARTH*”
Twentieth
Software
Objectual
Lecture

Size 7 pt

Leading 8 pt

In this book, information and difference are considered as alternately regulative and generative. Regulative information—typically referred to as Shannon, cybernetic, or mathematical information theory—is a measure of the amount of difference introduced into an already-constituted context. Here, information emerges as a kind of probabilistic friction generated by a difference as it scrapes against the norms and prevailing conditions of the situation it enters. Generative information, on the other hand, of the type described by Simondon, differs from the regulative in that it is not a difference that emerges from, or enters into, the regulative constraints of a context. Rather, generative information is an operation that reconciles differences in a way that reconfigures, intensifies, or constitutes a context—thereby catalyzing a difference at a higher order of intensity. Much of the peculiar import of Rauschenberg's *This Is a Portrait of Iris Clert If I Say So* arises from (and as) such relations of difference across multiple scales. In other words, prior to its introduction of difference into the artworld context (regulative/Shannon information), Rauschenberg's telegram is a convergence of difference (generative/Simondon information): of art and telegram, of telegram and art, of art/telegram and world, of art as telegram and artworld, and so on. This generative convergence of difference intensifies the work and catalyzes it as art in the first place—revving it up and rendering it noteworthy enough to show up as a difference that makes a difference relative to (and as regulated by) expectation. Considered philosophically, regulative information, as the introduction of a difference, is thus analogous to information as being. Information as becoming, alongside our usual implicit focus on information as being, opens up the notion not only of art as an artwork (art as being, as an object or form), but of an artwork as art's working (art as becoming, as an operation or process).

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Size 9 pt

Leading 10 pt

In this book, information and difference are considered as alternately regulative and generative. Regulative information—typically referred to as Shannon, cybernetic, or mathematical information theory—is a measure of the amount of difference introduced into an already-constituted context. Here, information emerges as a kind of probabilistic friction generated by a difference as it scrapes against the norms and prevailing conditions of the situation it enters. Generative information, on the other hand, of the type described by Simondon, differs from the regulative in that it is not a difference that emerges from, or enters into, the regulative constraints of a context. Rather, generative information is an operation that reconciles differences in a way that reconfigures, intensifies, or constitutes a context—thereby catalyzing a difference at a higher order of intensity. Much of the peculiar import of Rauschenberg's *This Is a Portrait of Iris Clert If I Say So* arises from (and as) such relations of difference across multiple scales. In other words, prior to its introduction of difference into the artworld context (regulative/Shannon information), Rauschenberg's telegram is a convergence of difference (generative/Simondon information): of art and telegram, of telegram and art, of art/telegram and world, of art as telegram and artworld, and so on. This generative convergence of difference intensifies the work and catalyzes it as art in the first place—revving it up and rendering it noteworthy enough to show up as a difference that makes a difference relative to (and as regulated by) expectation. Information as becoming, alongside our usual implicit focus on information as being, opens up the notion not only of art as an artwork (art as being, as an object or form), but of an artwork as art's working (art as becoming, as an operation or process).

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Aesthetic experience, in other words, is the generative experience of information in its peculiar, artistic mode: information that not only introduces a difference, but produces and sustains an operation of differencing. Considered as such, an artwork is what I call a differential object, or *différance* engine: a differential driver of difference itself, akin to Jacques Derrida's description of *différance* as a productive motion or weave of continuous difference and deferral without stopping point.' We see such a *différance* engine, sustained by and woven together as a reverberation of difference across scales, with the back-and-forth feedback loop of reciprocal differences between art and telegram that constitute Rauschenberg's *This Is a Portrait of Iris Clert If I Say So*. Similarly, artists' ideas and their artworks do not merely arise within an artworld, as a predetermined set of aesthetic objects situated in a preexisting discursive space. Rather, artists, artworks, artistic styles, and artworld dynamically interoperate and shape one another across multiple levels, both in the moment and across time—akin to Andrew Goodman's ecologic description of a field of forces engaged in, and composed of, multiple orders of resonant relation with the entities that exist within the field of forces itself."

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Gallery
Space

Similarly Physical
Feedback Symbolic
Preeexist *Adjective*
IDEAS *Siècle**
Abstract Adaptive
Ecology FUZZY

Size 7 pt

Leading 8 pt

Art's efflorescence of direct aesthetic difference thus catalyzed a kind of theoretic and discursive butterfly effect—a cascade of disruption that rippled across the network of relations by (and as) which the artworld of the day was constituted. This disruptive burst of difference—a kind of information bomb dropped into the artworld—triggered the profound transformations of art and theory that unfolded with increasing intensity over the course of the 1960s.” Although these claims might sound far out or abstract, they are latent within even the now-established and comparatively mainstream art-theoretic ideas of the era. For example, Michael Fried's notion of theatrical space, as outlined in his 1967 essay “Art and Objecthood,” describes how the ostensibly blank minimal art object no longer absorbs the viewer's attention but instead asserts a direct presence that folds both the viewer and the gallery space into the purview of the artwork—as if they all share the same stage. Similarly, Arthur Danto, with his notion of the artworld, argued in 1964 that contemporary artworks activate (and are activated by) an entire sphere of mutually reinforcing and continually evolving art-theoretic ideas by which different modes of art are made possible in different discursive contexts. Implicit in both of these examples—which are explored in greater detail alongside other discursive information fields as the book progresses—is an expansion of scale from work to world and back again.” For Fried, the artwork unfolds into, integrates, and activates the space of the gallery, while for Danto the artwork both enfolds and is activated by a world or atmosphere of theories and ideas. Each has their own trajectory of operation, with Fried describing a vector outward from the work to the world, and Danto describing a vector inward, from the world to the work.

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If this sounds abstract, consider how Edouard Manet's 1863 painting *Le Déjeuner sur l'herbe* (*Luncheon on the Grass*) emphasized the flatness of its painted surface more explicitly than any other European painting had since late medieval times. Considered outrageous when first shown, the painting's shallow picture space and overt acknowledgment of its flat support proved highly influential to how other painters approached pictorial flatness. The increasingly flattened and foregrounded picture planes of subsequent artists like Vincent van Gogh and Georges Seurat changed the game so thoroughly that, within a decade or two, Manet's work seemed conservative and spatially deep in comparison. Important here is that the difference, or information, introduced by Manet's flattened picture space triggered further difference, which cascaded through the artworld of the day. This cascade of difference transformed the context in which the original differences operated, which transformed the parameters of what could subsequently show up as different within that transformed context. As a result, painterly differences introduced by Manet in 1863 would not have registered as different if introduced in 1883, because of differential processes Manet's work had catalyzed in the first place.

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Data *Series*

Through **Query**
Viewer ***Ongoing***
Artwork **Painters**
FLUX* ***Jewels***
Example **ANGLES**
Lastly ***Initially***

Size 7 pt

Leading 8 pt

Art is an epiphenomenon of its own peculiar mode of appearing in the world. Epiphenomena are contingent effects of a deeper relation, and they compel attention because they seem at once undeniably real and obvious yet intangible and irresolvable. Rainbows are the most widely known example of this, being epiphenomena of a particular relationship between sunlight, atmospheric moisture, and an observer. While sunlight and moisture on their own may or may not compel attention, when they relate in a certain way in the presence of an observer, the result is the strange and alluring experience of a rainbow. These relations, however, must be in the correct arrangement for the rainbow to show up, and if the relations change, the rainbow disappears. As long as the relation holds, however, the rainbow's arc of atmospheric color is real enough to be seen and shared by observers, while never quite becoming tangible enough to touch or locate. Works of art, as epiphenomena, trigger similarly shared experiences that are simultaneously compelling and difficult to pinpoint. Consider how, even with a work of art widely considered a masterpiece, there is no particular area we can point to and say, here, this is the specific thing that makes this art. Rather, the art of an artwork is a diffused and difficult-to-specify quality, a surplus experiential activity we can feel but cannot quite locate or define. Like a rainbow's shimmering indeterminacy, art is an ensemble effect that emerges from deeper relations, in art's case from relations of difference. Art's differential relations prompt an encounter difficult to determine or resolve, and this sustained resistance to resolution acts as both the cause and the effect of the artwork's art in the first place.

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Accordingly, an artwork is not epiphenomenally manifest as ambiguous or indeterminate, but rather, the relational ambiguity or indeterminacy *is* the art of the artwork in the first place. That is, while an artwork's physical object and its context might each be definite and stable in and of themselves, if *the relations between* the object and the context trigger and sustain indefiniteness and complex ambiguity, this acts as a prompt for aesthetic experience. Again, these complex indeterminacies not only arise from a work's status as an artwork, but are *the preconditions of its status as a work of art*—of its phenomenalization or emergence as art from the get-go. Cézanne's apple paintings and Rauschenberg's telegram are not indeterminate or strange because they are art; they are art because they are unfinalizably strange and indeterminate. Art is not some sort of quality or essence inherent to or applied to an object, but is rather a difficult-to-pinpoint and interpretively open object/context feedback relation that never entirely fits, settles, or resolves itself into the world. While we read no intent in a rainbow, as social beings we cannot help but read intention into something that has been made and presented to us by someone else.

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Technical specification

À	Á	Ă	Ǽ	Â	Ä	Ạ	À	Ā	Ą	Å	Ǻ	Ã	Æ	É	B	
A	Acute	Abreve	Acaron	Acircumflex	Aleresis	Adotbelow	Agrave	Amacron	Aogonek	Aring	Aringacute	Abide	AE	AEacute	B	
Ĕ	Ċ	Ć	Č	Ç	Ĉ	Ċ	D	Ð	Ǳ	Ḑ	Đ	Ḑ	Ḑ	Ḑ	E	
Bdotaccent	C	Cacute	Caron	Ccedilla	Ccircumflex	Cdotaccent	D	Eth	Dcaron	Dcedilla	Dcroat	Ddotaccent	Ddotbelow	Dlinebelow	E	
É	Ě	Ě	Ê	Ë	È	Ę	È	Ē	Ę	Ě	F	Ƒ	G	Ǧ	Ǧ	
Eacute	Ebreve	Ecaron	Ecircumflex	Ederesis	Edotaccent	Edotbelow	Egrave	Emacron	Eogonek	Elide	F	Fdotaccent	G	Gbreve	Gcircumflex	
Ĝ	Ǻ	Ḡ	Ḡ	H	ẞ	Ḥ	Ǻ	Ĥ	Ḥ	Ḥ	I	U	Í	Ĭ	Ĭ	
Garon	Gcommaaccent	Gdotaccent	Gmacron	H	Hbar	Hbrevebelow	Hcaron	Hcircumflex	Hdotaccent	Hdotbelow	I	Ij	Iacute	Ibreve	Icaron	
Î	İ	İ	İ	Ì	Ī	Ĳ	†	Ĩ	J	Ĵ	K	ǰ	Ƙ	L	Ł	
Icircumflex	Ileresis	Idotaccent	Iidotbelow	Igrave	Imacron	Iogonek	Istroke	Itilde	J	Jcircumflex	K	Karon	Kcommaaccent	L	Lacute	
Ł	Ł	Ł	Ł	Ł	Ł	Ł	M	Ɔ	Ḣ	Ḣ	N	Ɔ	Ǻ	Ɔ	Ɔ	
Lcaron	Lcommaaccent	Ldot	Ldotbelow	Ldotbelowmacron	Llinebelow	Lslash	M	Macute	Mdotaccent	Mdotbelow	N	Nacute	Ncaron	Ncommaaccent	Ndotaccent	
Ḣ	Ɔ	Ɔ	Ɔ	Ɔ	Ɔ	Ɔ	O	Ó	Ǿ	Ǿ	Ô	Ö	Ò	Ọ	Ò	Ö
Ndotbelow	Ngrave	Eng	Nhookleft	Ninebelow	Ntilde	O	O	Oacute	Obreve	Ocaron	Ocircumflex	Odiereis	Odotaccent	Odotbelow	Ograve	Ohungarumlaut
Ō	Q	Ø	Ø	Õ	Œ	P	Ḑ	Ḑ	Q	R	Ŕ	Ř	Ŕ	Ŕ	Ŕ	
Omacron	Oogonek	Oslash	Oslashacute	Otilde	OE	P	Pdotaccent	Thorn	Q	R	Racute	Rcaron	Rcommaaccent	Rdotbelow	Rdotbelowmacron	

Ŕ	Ŗ	Ś	Ŝ	Ş	Ŝ	Ș	Š	Ş	ß	ə	Ť	Ʀ	Ť	Ț	Ț
Rinebelow	S	Sacute	Scaron	Scedilla	Scircumflex	Scommaaccent	Sdotaccent	Sdotbelow	GermanicBla	Schwa	T	Tbar	Tcaron	Tcedilla	Tcommaaccent
Ť	Ț	Ț	U	Ú	Ů	Ǔ	ǔ	Û	Ü	Ụ	Ù	Ů	Ū	Ț	Ǔ
Tdotaccent	Tdotbelow	Tlinebelow	U	Uacute	Ubar	Ubreve	Ucaron	Ucircumflex	Udieresis	Udotbelow	Ugrave	Uhungarumlaut	Umacron	Uogonek	Uring
Ū	V	Ŵ	W	Ŵ	Ŷ	Ẁ	ẁ	X	Ẃ	Y	Ý	ÿ	ÿ	ÿ	Ț
Utilde	V	Vtilde	W	Wacute	Wcircumflex	Wdieresis	Wgrave	X	Xdotaccent	Y	Yacute	Ycircumflex	Ydieresis	Ygrave	Ymacron
Ŷ	Z	Ž	Ž	Ž	Ż	Ẑ	ẑ	Ć	Ń	Ó	Ś	Ż	Ů	Ț	Ĵ
Ytilde	Z	Zacute	Zcaron	Zdotaccent	Zdotbelow	Zstroke	lacute_llocNLD	Cacute.locPLK	Nacute.locPLK	Oacute.locPLK	Sacute.locPLK	Zacute.locPLK	l.ss01	J.ss01	Jcircumflex.ss01
Q	Ů	Ů	Ů	a	á	ă	ă	â	ä	ą	à	ā	ą	å	á
Q.ss02	l.locNLD	l.locNLD.ss01	lacute_llocNLD.ss01	a	acute	abreve	acaron	acircumflex	adieresis	adotbelow	agrave	amacron	ogonek	aring	aringacute
ã	æ	æ	b	ḃ	c	ć	č	ç	ĉ	ċ	d	ď	d'	ḍ	ḍ
atilde	ae	aeacute	b	bdotaccent	c	cacute	ccaron	ccedilla	ccircumflex	cdotaccent	d	eth	dcaron	dcedilla	dscroat
ḍ	ḍ	ḍ	e	é	ě	ě	ê	ë	è	ẹ	è	ē	ẹ	ě	ə
ddotaccent	ddotbelow	dlinebelow	e	eacute	ebreve	ecaron	edcircumflex	edieresis	edotaccent	edotbelow	egrave	emacron	ogonek	etilde	schwa
f	ƒ	g	ǧ	ǧ	ĝ	ǧ	ǧ	ḡ	h	ħ	ḥ	ħ	ĥ	h	ḥ
f	fdotaccent	g	gbreve	gcaron	gcircumflex	gcommaaccent	gdotaccent	gmacron	h	hbar	hbrevebelow	hcaron	hcircumflex	hdotaccent	hdotbelow

ï	l	í	ï	ÿ	î	ï	ı	ı̇	ì	ij	ī	ı̇	ı̇	ĩ	j	
i	ldotless	iacute	ibreve	icaron	icircumflex	idieresis	idotaccent	idotbelow	igrave	ij	imacron	iogonek	istroke	itilde	j	
ı̇	ĵ	k	ķ	ķ̇	ƙ	l	l̇	l̇	ı̇	ı̇	ı̇	ı̇	ı̇	ı̇	m	
jdotless	jcircumflex	k	lcaron	lcommaaccent	lgreenlandic	l	lacute	lcaron	lcommaaccent	ldot	ldotbelow	ldotbelowmacron	linebelow	lslash	m	
ń	ñ	ņ	n	ń	ñ	ň	ņ	ň	ņ	ň	ņ	ņ̇	ņ	ņ	o	
macute	ndotaccent	ndotbelow	n	nacute	nastrophe	ncaron	ncommaaccent	ndotaccent	ndotbelow	ngrave	eng	nhookleft	nlinebelow	ntilde	o	
ó	ö	ö	ô	ö	ò	ȯ	ò	ö	ō	o	ø	ø	õ	œ	p	
oacute	obreve	ocaron	ocircumflex	odieresis	odotaccent	odotbelow	ograve	ohungarumlaut	omacron	oogonek	oslash	oslashacute	otilde	oe	p	
ř	ř	q	r	ř	ř	ř	ř	ř̇	ř	s	ś	š	ş	ș	ș	
rdotaccent	rthorn	q	r	racute	rcaron	rcommaaccent	rdotbelow	rdotbelowmacron	rlinebelow	s	sacute	scaron	scedilla	scircumflex	scommaaccent	
š	ş	ß	f	t	ţ	ţ	ţ	ţ	ţ	ţ	ţ	ţ	u	ú	ı̇	
sdotaccent	sdotbelow	germandbls	longs	t	tbar	tcaron	tcedilla	tcommaaccent	tdieresis	tdotaccent	tdotbelow	tlinebelow	u	uacute	ubar	
ů	ů	û	ü	ı̇	ù	ú	ū	ı̇	ı̇	ı̇	ı̇	v	ĩ	w	ŵ	ŵ
ubreve	ucaron	ucircumflex	udieresis	udotbelow	ugrave	uhungarumlaut	umacron	uogonek	uring	utilde	v	vtilde	w	wacute	wcircumflex	
ÿ	ÿ	x	ẋ	y	ý	ÿ	ÿ	ÿ	ÿ	ÿ	z	z	ž	ž	ż	
ydieresis	ygrave	x	xdotaccent	y	yacute	ycircumflex	ydieresis	ygrave	ymacron	ytilde	z	zacute	zcaron	zdotaccent	zdotbelow	



























z	ß	í	ć	ń	ó	ś	ź	f	ƒ	ij	j	J	í	ĵ	î
zstroke	germandbls.calt	iacute_llocNLD	ccacute.lociPLK	nacute.lociPLK	oacute.lociPLK	sacute.lociPLK	zacute.lociPLK	f.ss01	fdotaccent.ss01	ij.ss01	j.ss01	jdotless.ss01	jacute.ss01	jcaron.ss01	jcircumflex.ss01
r	ŕ	ř	ꞛ	ꞛ	ṛ	ṛ	t	ṭ	ṭ	ṭ	ṭ	ṭ	ṭ	ý	y
r.ss01	racute.ss01	rcaron.ss01	rcommaaccent.ss01	rdotbelow.ss01	rdotbelowmacron.ss01	rmacronbelow.ss01	t.ss01	tcaron.ss01	tcedilla.ss01	tcommaaccent.ss01	tdieresis.ss01	tdotaccent.ss01	tdotbelow.ss01	tmacronbelow.ss01	y.ss01
ý	ÿ	ÿ	ÿ	ȳ	ÿ	d	d'	ḏ	ḏ	ḏ	ú	u	ú	†	
ycute.ss01	ycircumflex.ss01	ydieresis.ss01	ygrave.ss01	ymacron.ss01	ytilde.ss01	d.ss02	dcaron.ss02	dcedilla.ss02	droat.ss02	ddotaccent.ss02	ddotbelow.ss02	dmacronbelow.ss02	u.ss02	ucute.ss02	ubar.ss02
ů	ů	û	ü	ұ	ù	ú	ū	ұ	ů	ũ	ff	ffi	ffj	ffl	fj
ubreve.ss02	ucaron.ss02	ucircumflex.ss02	udieresis.ss02	udotbelow.ss02	ugrave.ss02	uhungarumlaut.ss02	umacron.ss02	uogonek.ss02	uring.ss02	utilde.ss02	f.f	f.f_i	f.f_j	f.f_l	f.f
ft	fi	fl	ij	ff	ffi	ffj	ffl	fj	ft	fi	fl	ij	í	a	b
f.t	fi	fl	i_jlocNLD	f.f_ss01	f.f_lss01	f.f_jss01	f.f_lss01	f.f_ss01	f.f_ss01	f.f_ss01	f.f_ss01	i_jlocNLD.ss01	iacute_llocNLD.ss01	a.subs	b.subs
c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r
c.subs	d.subs	e.subs	f.subs	g.subs	h.subs	i.subs	j.subs	k.subs	l.subs	m.subs	n.subs	o.subs	p.subs	q.subs	r.subs
s	t	u	v	w	x	y	z	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h
s.subs	t.subs	u.subs	v.subs	w.subs	x.subs	y.subs	z.subs	a.subs	b.subs	c.subs	d.subs	e.subs	f.subs	g.subs	h.subs
i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t	u	v	w	x
i.subs	j.subs	k.subs	l.subs	m.subs	n.subs	o.subs	p.subs	q.subs	r.subs	s.subs	t.subs	u.subs	v.subs	w.subs	x.subs

y	z	f	j	r	t	y	f	j	r	t	y	d	u	d	u
y.sups	z.sups	f.subs.ss01	j.subs.ss01	r.subs.ss01	t.subs.ss01	y.subs.ss01	f.sups.ss01	j.sups.ss01	r.sups.ss01	t.sups.ss01	y.sups.ss01	d.subs.ss02	u.subs.ss02	d.sups.ss02	u.sups.ss02
a	o	Δ	Ω	μ	π										
ordfeminine	ordmasculine	Delta	Omega	mu	pi										
I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	X	XI	XII	L	C	D	M
One-roman	Two-roman	Three-roman	Four-roman	Five-roman	Six-roman	Seven-roman	Eight-roman	Nine-roman	Ten-roman	Eleven-roman	Twelve-roman	Fifty-roman	Hundred-roman	Fivehundred-roman	Thousand-roman
i	ii	iii	iv	v	vi	vii	viii	ix	x	xi	xii	l	c	d	m
one-roman	two-roman	three-roman	four-roman	five-roman	six-roman	seven-roman	eight-roman	nine-roman	ten-roman	eleven-roman	twelve-roman	fifty-roman	hundred-roman	fivehundred-roman	onethousand-roman
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	0	1	2	3	4
zero	one	two	three	four	five	six	seven	eight	nine	zero.zero	zero.blackCircled	one.blackCircled	two.blackCircled	three.blackCircled	four.blackCircled
5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0
five.blackCircled	six.blackCircled	seven.blackCircled	eight.blackCircled	nine.blackCircled	zero.blackSquared	one.blackSquared	two.blackSquared	three.blackSquared	four.blackSquared	five.blackSquared	six.blackSquared	seven.blackSquared	eight.blackSquared	nine.blackSquared	zero.circled
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
one.circled	two.circled	three.circled	four.circled	five.circled	six.circled	seven.circled	eight.circled	nine.circled	zero.squared	one.squared	two.squared	three.squared	four.squared	five.squared	six.squared
7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	0	0
seven.squared	eight.squared	nine.squared	zero.tf	one.tf	two.tf	three.tf	four.tf	five.tf	six.tf	seven.tf	eight.tf	nine.tf	zero.tfzero	zero.blackCircled.zero	zero.circled.zero

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5
zero.dnom	one.dnom	two.dnom	three.dnom	four.dnom	five.dnom	six.dnom	seven.dnom	eight.dnom	nine.dnom	zeroinferior	oneinferior	twoinferior	threeinferior	fourinferior	fiveinferior
6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1
sixinferior	seveninferior	eightinferior	nineinferior	zero.numr	one.numr	two.numr	three.numr	four.numr	five.numr	six.numr	seven.numr	eight.numr	nine.numr	zerosuperior	onesuperior
2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	/	1/2	1/3	2/3	1/4	3/4	1/8	3/8
twosuperior	threesuperior	foursuperior	fivesuperior	sixsuperior	sevensuperior	eightsuperior	ninesuperior	fraction	onehalf	onethird	twothirds	onequarter	threequarters	oneeighth	threeeighths
5/8	7/8	∅	∅	∅	∅										
fiveeighths	seveineighths	zero.subs.zero	zero.dnom.zero	zero.numr.zero	zerosuperior.zero	space									
.	,	:	;	...	!	¡	?	¿	·	•	*	**	!!	?	#
period	comma	colon	semicolon	ellipsis	exclam	exclamdown	question	questiondown	periodcentered	bullet	asterisk	asterism	exclamdouble	interrobang	numbersign
/	\	**	¡	¿	·	•	·	·	,	:	;	...	·		
slash	backslash	twoasteriskvertical	exclamdown.case	questiondown.case	periodcentered.case	bullet.case	periodcentered.locCAT	period.tf	comma.tf	colon.tf	semicolon.tf	ellipsis.tf	periodcentered.tf	bullet.tf	asterisk.tf
numbersign.tf	slash.tf	backslash.tf	periodcentered.locCAT.case	hyphen	softhyphen	endash	emdash	hyphentwo	nonbreakinghyphen	underscore	hyphen.case	softhyphen.case	endash.case	emdash.case	hyphen.tf
•	*	()	{	}	[]	()	{	}	[]	()
underscore.tf	hyphen.tf.case	parenleft	parenright	braceleft	braceright	bracketleft	bracketright	parenleft.case	parenright.case	braceleft.case	braceright.case	bracketleft.case	bracketright.case	parenleft.subs	parenright.subs

{	}	[]	()	{	}	[]	()	{	}	[]
braceleft.subs	bracerright.subs	bracketleft.subs	bracketright.subs	parenleft.sups	parenright.sups	braceleft.sups	bracerright.sups	bracketleft.sups	bracketright.sups	parenleft.tf	parenright.tf	braceleft.tf	bracerright.tf	bracketleft.tf	bracketright.tf
()	{	}	[]	()	{	}	[]	()	{	}
parenleft.tf.case	parenright.tf.case	braceleft.tf.case	bracerright.tf.case	bracketleft.tf.case	bracketright.tf.case	quotessingbase	quotedbbase	quotedbleft	quotedbright	quoteleft	quoteright	guillemetleft	guillemetright	guilingleft	guilingright
[]	()	{	}	[»	<	>	"	'	«	»	<	>
quottedbl	quotesingle	guillemetleft.case	guillemetright.case	guilingleft.case	guilingright.case	guillemetleft.ss03	guillemetright.ss03	guilingleft.ss03	guilingright.ss03	quottedbl.tf	quotesingle.tf	guillemetleft.case.ss03	guillemetright.case.ss03	guilingleft.case.ss03	guilingright.case.ss03
f	f	★	☆	✓	×	₱	₱	☐	@	&	¶	§	©	®	®
florin	florin.tf	blackstar	whitestar	checkmark	multiplicationX	accountof	addresstothesubject	apple	at	ampersand	paragraph	section	copyright	registered	published
™	%	°	'	"		!	ℓ	†	‡	e	Nº	°C	°F	SM	@
trademark	careof	degree	minute	second	bar	brokenbar	literSign	dagger	daggerdbl	estimated	numero	centigrade	fahrenheit	servicemark	at.case
	!	©	®	®	§	°	'	"		!		!	‡	e	Nº
bar.case	brokenbar.case	copyright.ss04	registered.ss04	published.ss04	section.tf	degree.tf	minute.tf	second.tf	bar.tf	brokenbar.tf	bar.tf.case	brokenbar.case.tf	numero	centigrade	fahrenheit
°C	°F	SM	@		!	©	®	®	§	°	'	"		!	
servicemark	at.case	bar.case	brokenbar.case	copyright.ss04	registered.ss04	published.ss04	section.tf	degree.tf	minute.tf	second.tf	bar.tf	brokenbar.tf	bar.tf.case	brokenbar.tf.case	bitcoin
!	₿	¢	₪	\$	€	₺	₤	₹	₹	₹	₹	₹	₹	₹	₹
cent	currency	dollar	euro	hryvnia	lira	liraTurkish	naira	ruble	rupeeindian	sheqel	sterling	tenge	won	yen	bitcoin.tf

¥	₿	¢	₠	\$	€	₺	£	₹	₪	₱	₹	₮	₦	₮	₩
cent.tf	currency.tf	dollar.tf	euro.tf	hryvnia.tf	lira.tf	iraTurkish.tf	naira.tf	ruble.tf	rupeeIndian.tf	sheqel.tf	sterling.tf	tenge.tf	won.tf	yen.tf	dotmath
¥	•	+	-	×	÷	=	≠	>	<	≧	≦	±	≈	~	∞
plus	minus	multiply	divide	equal	notequal	greater	less	greatequal	lessequal	plusminus	aproxequal	asciitilde	logicalnot	asciicircum	infinity
^	∞	∅	∫	Ω	Δ	Π	Σ	√	∂	μ	%	‰	•	+	-
emptyset	integral	Ohm	increment	product	summation	radical	partialdiff	micro	percent	perthousand	dotmath.case	plus.case	minus.case	multiply.case	divide.case
×	÷	=	≠	>	<	≧	≦	±	≈	∞	~	•	+	-	×
equal.case	notequal.case	greater.case	less.case	greatequal.case	lessequal.case	plusminus.case	aproxequal.case	logicalnot.case	asciitilde.case	dotmath.tf	plus.tf	minus.tf	multiply.tf	divide.tf	equal.tf
÷	=	≠	>	<	≧	≦	±	≈	~	∞	^	%	‰	•	+
notequal.tf	greater.tf	less.tf	greatequal.tf	lessequal.tf	plusminus.tf	aproxequal.tf	asciitilde.tf	logicalnot.tf	asciicircum.tf	percent.tf	perthousand.tf	dotmath.tf.case	plus.tf.case	minus.tf.case	multiply.tf.case
-	×	÷	=	≠	>	<	≧	≦	±	≈	∞	~	↑	↗	→
divide.tf.case	equal.tf.case	notequal.tf.case	greater.tf.case	less.tf.case	greatequal.tf.case	lessequal.tf.case	plusminus.tf.case	aproxequal.tf.case	logicalnot.tf.case	asciitilde.tf.case	upArrow	northEastArrow	rightArrow	southEastArrow	downArrow
↙	↓	↖	←	↗	↔	↕	↠	↡	↢	↣	↤	↥	↦	↧	↩
southWestArrow	leftArrow	northWestArrow	leftRightArrow	upDownArrow	leftFrombarArrow	upFrombarArrow	rightFrombarArrow	downFrombarArrow	leftHookArrow	rightHookArrow	upToLeftArrow	upToRightArrow	downToLeftArrow	downToRightArrow	carriagereturn
↔	↕	↖	↗	↘	↑	↗	→	←	↖	↔	↕	↠	↡	↢	↣
rightOverLeftArrow	upAndDownArrow	leftAndRightArrow	rightDoublePairedArrow	leftDoublePairedArrow	upArrow.case	northEastArrow.case	rightArrow.case	leftArrow.case	northWestArrow.case	leftRightArrow.case	upDownArrow.case	leftFrombarArrow.case	upFrombarArrow.case	rightFrombarArrow.case	downFrombarArrow.case

															
leftHookArrow.case	rightHookArrow.case	upTipLeftArrow.case	upTipRightArrow.case	downTipLeftArrow.case	downTipRightArrow.case	blackCircle	whiteCircle	whiteBullet	lozenge	blackSquare	whiteSquare	dieresis	dotaccent	grave	acute
															
hungarumlaut	circumflex	caron	breve	ring	tilde	macron	cedilla	ogonek	ringacute						

Case sensitive form (Parentheses)
 Case sensitive form (Punctuation)
 Case sensitive form (Symbols)
 Case sensitive form (Arrows)
 Case sensitive form (Math Symbols)
 Case sensitive form (@)
 OpenType features (Slashed zero)
 OpenType features (Tabular figures)
 OpenType features (Fraction)
 OpenType features (Inferiors and Superiors)
 Standard ligatures (ff)
 Standard ligatures (fi)

○ Off

({[•std]})

«¡viva!»

f—w|2021

terminal→

a+b≠a×c

@ftype@

1.000

1250,00₩

1/2 2/3 3/4

Park(1) P1

Dayoff

Unfinished

● On

({[•STD]})

«¡VIVA!»

F—W|2021

TERMINAL→

A+B≠A×C

FTYPE

1.000

1250,00₩

½ ⅔ ¾

Park⁽¹⁾ P₍₁₎

Dayoff

Unfinished

Standard ligatures (fi)
 Standard ligatures (ffi)
 Standard ligatures (ffl)
 Discretionary Ligatures (ft)
 Discretionary Ligatures (fj)
 Discretionary Ligatures (ffi)
 Discretionary Ligatures (German ss, SS)
 Localized Forms (Turkish)
 Localized Forms (Moldavian)
 Localized Forms (Romanian)
 Localized Forms (Dutch)
 Localized Forms (Catalan)

○ Off

Influence

Offloading

Officiality

After

Sufjan

Cliffjumper

Auss, AUSS

DIYARBAKIR

Timișoara

Spațiu

Stedelijk

Paral·lel

● On

Influence

Offloading

Officiality

After

Sufjan

Cliffjumper

Auß, AUß

DİYARBAKIR

Timișoara

Spațiu

Stedelijk

Parallel

Contextual alternates (Fahrenheit)
 Contextual alternates (Centigrade)
 Contextual alternates (Numero)
 Contextual alternates (accountof)
 Contextual alternates (careof)
 Contextual alternates (addressedtothesubject)
 Contextual alternates (Multiply)
 Contextual alternates (Arrows)
 Contextual alternates (Circled numbers)
 Contextual alternates (Blackcircled numbers)
 Contextual alternates (Squared numbers)
 Contextual alternates (Blacksquared numbers)

○ Off

● On

100 °F

100 °F

37,5 °C

37,5 °C

N° 5000

Nº 5000

a/c

a/c

c/o

c/o

a/s

a/s

10x10x20

10×10×20

-> <-

→ ←

(1)(2)(3)

① ① ②

(-1-)(-2-)(-3-)

① ② ②

[1][2][3]

[1] [2] [3]

[-1-][-2-][-3-]

1 2 3

Stilistic set 01 (Alternate Q)
 Stilistic set 01 (Alternate J)
 Stilistic set 01 (Alternate f, j, r, t)
 Stilistic set 01 (Alternate t, r)
 Stilistic set 01 (Alternate r, t, y)
 Stilistic set 01 (Standard ligatures)
 Stilistic set 01 (Discretionary ligatures)
 Stilistic set 02 (Alternate d)
 Stilistic set 02 (Alternate u)
 Stilistic set 03 (Alternate o)
 Stilistic set 03 (Alternate «»)
 Stilistic set 04 (Alternate ***)

○ Off

● On

Question

Question

Jelly

Jelly

After jogging

After jogging

Transport

Transport

Simmetry

Simmetry

ff, fi, fl, ffi, ffl

ff, fi, fl, ffi, ffl

ft, fj, ffj

ft, fj, ffj

Address

Address

Further

Further

«Typography»

«Typography»

‹Design›

‹Design›

©®®

©®®

Stylistic Set 1 (Alternate J, Q) Off

QUJING

Stylistic Set 1 (Alternate J, Q) Off

QUJING

Stylistic Set 1 (Alternate f, j, r, t, y) Off

forty, djs

Stylistic Set 1 (Alternate f, j, r, t, y) Off

forty, djs

Stylistic Set 2 (Alternate d, u) Off

Graduate

Stylistic Set 2 (Alternate d, u) Off

Graduate

Stylistic Set 3 (Alternate «»») Off

«OKAY»

Stylistic Set 3 (Alternate «»») Off

«OKAY»

Stylistic Set 4 (Alternate ®) Off

MoMA®

Stylistic Set 4 (Alternate ®) Off

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